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ABSTRACT
Looking at the societies of Haiti and Japan after the earthquakes, the effects of the disasters
to each society are not the same. This research paper discusses that the effects of a disaster
on society are the result of social conditions. Utilizing the theories of world-system
perspective and risk society, this paper tries to understand how historical process
contributes to contemporary social structure and how a holistic approach is important to
the discussion of different experiences of the earthquakes in Haiti and Japan. As a method,
comparative historical method is utilized with the focus of within-case method, and major
sources for this research are collected from historical documents from both primary and
secondary sources. Discussions include brief histories of Haiti and Japan, the world
position of Haiti and Japan within world-system perspective, the effects of the earthquakes
occurred in Haiti and Japan, and different experiences and effects of the earthquakes on
each society as well as their struggles.
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INTRODUCTION
Natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, heat waves,
and volcanic eruptions have been observed in every society in the world. One of the
characteristics of those natural disasters is that it is not fully possible to anticipate the
occurrence of a disaster even with highly developed scientific technologies today. Also,
natural disasters do not differentiate the time and area they occur, therefore almost every
society experiences disasters based on the geographic features of the land and the social
organization in relation to the land.
In 2010, Haiti experienced an earthquake and Japan experienced it the following
year. An earthquake is a natural disaster which many countries in the world experience.
However, the experiences of Haiti and Japan were not the same because their specific
infrastructural problems and effects on the population were very different. This paper
argues that disasters are neither naturally made nor simply environmental phenomena.
Disasters differ in every society since the effects of a disaster on society are the result of
social conditions. To argue this, world-system perspective and the theory of a risk society
help understand the different outcomes resulting from Haiti and Japan’s earthquakes.
Background
An answer for the question, “What is a disaster?,” has been debated among social
scientists who have contributed in different ways to conceptualize disasters and their
characteristics and influences on society. Kreps (1998:31) argues that when defining
disasters, they have been interpreted as “systemic events and social catalysts.” Disasters
are systemic events because they are dramatic historical happenings as well as
nonroutine, and disasters are social catalysts because they force collective reactions
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(Kreps 1998). According to Kreps (1998:34), disasters are “nonroutine events in societies
or their larger subsystems (e.g. regions, communities) that involve social disruption and
physical harm.”
In addition, he also emphasizes four dimensions along with defining disasters as
events; they are (1) length of forewarning, which is the amount of time spent to identify a
disaster and its effects on a location, (2) magnitude of effect, which refers to the degree of
physical harm and social disruption, (3) scope of effect, which is social and geographic
framework of physical harm and social disruption, and (4) duration of effect, which is a
time period until a disaster is no longer defined as producing the physical harm and social
disruption (Kreps 1998:34).
Therefore, his argument sustains the point that disasters are associations of
historical happenings which include the core dimensions of physical harm and social
disruption (Kreps 1998, 1984). His argument also includes disasters which are considered
man-made/technological hazards, such as the nuclear power plant accident at Three Mile
Island, the meltdown at Chernobyl, economic depressions as well as global warming
(Kreps 1998, 1984).
Unlike Kreps whose main focus is on physical harm and social disruption when
defining and analyzing disaster events, Hewitt (1983) has a more macro-level perspective
on natural disasters and its social relations. Hewitt (1983; 2007) criticizes the dominant
view of disaster research which argues natural disasters result from extremes or accidents
in geological feature. The dominant view interprets the nature of storms, earthquakes,
floods, and drought as “potential damage” to the human community, especially those who
are “vulnerable” (Hewitt 1983:5). Those hazard events are “described as ‘unscheduled’

8
and defined by objective uncertainty” (Hewitt 2007:49). The prediction of hazards and
disaster reductions, for the dominant view, are expected to be based on the latest
scientific knowledge and techniques of forecasting, such as monitoring, data processing,
and mathematical skills which are provided by technocratic agencies (Hewitt 1983;
2007).
Opposed to this view, Hewitt (1983) argues that natural disasters are not
explained by geophysical processes, and the damage, or human responses to disasters, are
not dependent on the geophysical processes. Instead, natural disasters are interpreted as
having the larger framework of historical circumstances, such as the ongoing social order,
everyday interaction with the habitat, or the structure of human-environment relations.
When analyzing natural disasters and its effects, it is necessary to pay attention to the
historical interactions which have been shaping the consequence of disasters (Hewitt
1983; Oliver-Smith 1994). Hewitt (1983) claims that the damage to our society from
most natural disasters are ‘characteristics’ rather than accidental events as the dominant
view argue; the risks, pressures, and uncertainties including awareness and preparedness
for natural disasters, are discussed as a result of “ordinary life” instead of events which
rarely happen.
Since natural disasters are interpreted to be characteristics of societies, social
order should be the central theme when discussing the causes of disaster and risks from
nature (Hewitt 1983). Social order includes the process and exercise of political and
economic power, regarding its level of vulnerabilities and institutional performance,
which functions as management when reacting to disasters (Hewitt 1983). Therefore, this
perspective maintains that disasters are not accidents that cause massive damage to
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society, instead disasters are caused by the social order (Oliver-Smith 1994). In his view,
most disasters are not disasters because of the damage they cause. Disasters do not occur
except as a direct result of characteristics and vulnerabilities developed by humans in the
framework of the historical process (Hewitt 1983; 2013). Hewitt (2013:5) states, “A
disaster comes about from the destructive interactions of environmental hazards, peoples’
exposure, vulnerability, and absent protections. At root, understanding depends upon
tracing out and explaining just how damages occur, where and to whom.”
For example, Hewitt (2007; 2013) points out the fact that more women died in
communities when the Indian Ocean tsunami happened in 2004, and more women and
elderly were also killed in the Kobe 1995 earthquake. The social explanations of these
unequal losses are related to specific historical and cultural conditions developed in
modern society. Those characteristics risk some people’s lives with larger losses than
others (Hewitt 2013).
Oliver-Smith (1998) argues that an adequate definition of disasters should
emphasize multidimensionality, and disasters as totalizing events. A disaster is “a
collectivity of intersecting processes and events, social, environmental, cultural, political,
economic, physical, technological, transpiring over varying lengths of time” (178).
Oliver-Smith (1998) focuses on the feature of multidimensionality and humanenvironment relations when defining disasters and its effects on society. When analyzing
disasters, he considers, from an ecological perspective, a society’s total adaptational
strategies (Oliver-Smith 1998). He argues that the development of a society stems from
the development of its environment and the consequences of the interactions between
societies and its environmental relations; thus, similar to Hewitt’s argument, societies are
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deeply influenced and modified by their historical environmental relations, and are
profoundly conditioned by the histories of societies (Oliver-Smith 1998). The links
between a society and its environment cannot be separated because doing so would
remove a society from the history that produced it (Oliver-Smith 1998).
Oliver-Smith (1998) stresses the influence of a disaster’s historical aspects on
society today by arguing “a disaster is made inevitable by the historically produced
pattern of vulnerability, evidenced in the location, infrastructure, sociopolitical structure,
production patterns, and ideology, that characterize a society” (187). Patterns of
vulnerability, planning, warning, evaluation, reconstruction and planning for earthquakes
and nuclear accidents are conditioned historically and within societal-environmental
relations (Oliver-Smith 1998). According to him, historical concepts and environmental
features influencing society must be included when defining disasters and attempting to
examine their effects on society (Oliver-Smith 1998).
Disaster and the Historical Relation: Disasters in Central and South America
In his study of the earthquake in the north-central coastal and Andean regions of
Peru, Oliver-Smith (1994) described it as “Peru’s five-hundred-year earthquake.” He
claims that the earthquake that occurred on May 31st in 1970 could be considered as a
disaster event which originates in its vulnerabilities and possible damage since the
conquest and colonization of Peru over 500 years ago (Oliver-Smith 1994).
Oliver-Smith (1994) discusses the Andean people’s adaptation to hazards in the
pre-Columbian Andean. The features of their building techniques and materials employed
showed that pre-Colombian Andean people carefully bonded each corner of the walls of
Incan buildings, utilized long vertical joints in houses, and employed a technique known
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as ‘English bond’ which had adobe in the construction of their houses. Adobe is
considered an important building material as well as stones when building rows (OliverSmith 1994). This technique of Incan people is thought to be far superior to the best
Mayan or Mexican construction (Oliver-Smith 1994).
In addition, Oliver-Smith (1994) points out the most significant feature of their
buildings is their thatched roofs. Even if their building techniques were not necessarily
anti-seismic, the thatched roofs functioned to avoid collapsing heavy roofs when an
earthquake happens. Also, their walls were built by utilizing a double structure with
trapezoidal-shaped doors and windows (Oliver-Smith 1994). The houses constructed with
thin walls built by stones and mud or adobe were about the height of a man, and this
implies that they could avoid possible harm which would happen from collapsing houses
or falling debris as a result of large earthquakes (Oliver-Smith 1994).
After arriving in Peru in 1530s, Spaniards attempted to control the Andean
people. They extracted the surpluses and enforced mass involuntary migration to place
people into new planned communities for the purpose of controlling them more
efficiently and bureaucratically (Oliver-Smith 1994). In the new communities, Spanish
techniques of building and construction design were adopted (Oliver-Smith 1994).
Although houses used to be spaced out with long paths, when Spanish settlement design
was utilized, it was changed to the grid pattern of perpendicular streets organized around
a central plaza (Oliver-Smith 1994). These streets were likely to be narrow and houses
were built close to each other (Oliver-Smith 1994). Oliver-Smith (1994) points out a
feature of those Spanish houses as the most dangerous of changes; they adopted the
ceramic barrel roof tile in addition to those materials they used to use, such as stones,
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adobe, and thatch. He argues that these narrow, perpendicular streets, and one or two
story houses with ceramic tile roofs have created a possibly extremely dangerous
situation due to the vulnerable construction on the seismically active land (Oliver-Smith
1994).
When an earthquake hit the region, because of the extreme weight of the ceramic
tile, roofs fell on the narrow streets resulting in a large number of people buried when
they remained within the buildings or attempted to escape (Oliver-Smith 1994). Also,
since the Spanish conquest and colonization changed Andean people’s political and
socio-economic patterns, systemic hardship and gaps between the wealthy and poor
developed (Oliver-Smith 1994). Oliver-Smith (1994) argues that this social system,
which they were forced to adopt, resulted in maldistribution of aid after the earthquake. It
was rooted in the urban social class systems and the ideologies of racial and cultural
biases against indigenous populations.
He concludes his argument that the devastation due to the earthquake in Peru was
“a product of the historical processes set in motion at the time of the conquest” (OliverSmith 1994:46). Over 10,000 years of habitation in the regions, Andean people had
already acquired, in their culture and construction skills, effective adaptation to natural
disasters. Their social vulnerability had been accentuated because of the conquest of
Spaniards and the adaptation to their system and technique (Oliver-Smith 1994).
The Statement of Problem
Based on the different perspective outlined above, there are several approaches to
understanding a disaster. According to Rodriguez and Russell (2004), it is important to
know “disasters do not happen ‘overnight’ but are ‘in the making,’ as a result of the
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cultural, historical, political, and economic processes that have shaped our societies”
(195). Since each society has different cultural, historical, political and economic
processes, different experiences of different societies, communities, or states are easily
anticipated when a disaster occurred.
As Oliver-Smith (2002) discusses, except for a few researches, when disaster
related problems are explained, the cultural, historical, political, and economic factors are
rarely analyzed in any detail or depth (23). A part of the problem is that “disaster is often
considered an event rather than a process” (23). As supported by the Peru’s earthquake’s
example of Oliver-Smith (1994) explains how the nation’s historical process is
significantly influential to a consequence of a disaster, thus a holistic explanation to the
degree of a disaster’s devastation is necessary when one attempts to fully understand why
nations react differently when a disaster occurs.
Research Objectives
This research investigates the importance of historical factors for different
societies after a disaster. This research stresses the influence of historical processes of
Haiti and Japan on the effects of the earthquakes in each society and helps to understand
how historical process contributes to contemporary social structure and how a more
holistic approach is important to the discussion of different experiences of the
earthquakes in Haiti and Japan. Utilizing Wallerstein’s world-system analysis, this
research investigates a holistic explanation of how the earthquakes affected the physical
conditions and the social structure in each country along with the possible continuous
struggles each country must face.
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Research Questions
This research investigates and address these questions: (1) What is the role of
historical processes in becoming core and periphery nations for contemporary society in
Haiti and Japan? (2) How does each country’s experience of a natural disaster, in this
case the earthquakes, differ in Haiti and Japan based on the notion of core and periphery?
And, (3) Does core nation status lead to issues associated with a risk society, and how its
status is relevant to the notion of risk society during a disaster?
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Approach: Risk Society
The concept of risk society, according to Ulrich Beck (1986), describes risk as
man-made risks that we encounter as a consequence of industrial society and those
decisions made in the use of techno-economic advantages. The concept of risk has a wide
historical framework in which Beck includes three different periods from pre-industrial
society, industrial society, to risk society (Mythen 2004). He argues that our society has
shifted from the industrial society to a risk society where “we were no longer threatened
by strange and violent nature, but by ourselves and our financial and technological
success in overcoming nature” (Beck 2011).
The risks, in the concept of risk society, are associated with environmental risks,
such as air pollution, chemical warfare and biotechnical production (Mythen 2004). Beck
(1986; 2006) distinguishes between catastrophe and risk and states that “risk does not
mean catastrophe; risk means the anticipation of catastrophe” (2006;332). The risks in
risk society are different from those effects that people experience from plagues, famines,
and natural disasters (Beck 1992; Mythen 2004). Therefore, “Risks are always events
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that are threatening. Without techniques of visualization, without symbolic forms,
without mass media etc., risks are nothing at all. In other words, it is irrelevant whether
we live in a world which is in fact or in some sense ‘objectively’ safer than all other
worlds; if destruction and disasters are anticipated, then that produces a compulsion to
act” (Beck 2006:332, 2011:665). The industrial risks are caused by the potential problems
of the incalculability, industrial or techno-scientific activities (Beck 1992).
Beck (1992; 2006; 2011) argues three features of risk.
1. De-localization: its causes and consequences not limited to one geographical
location or space, they are in principle omnipresent.
2. Incalculableness: its consequences are in principle incalculable; at bottom it is
a matter of ‘hypothetical’ risks, which, not least, are based on science-induced
not-knowing and normative dissent.
3. Non-compensatibility: the security dream of first modernity was based on the
scientific utopia of making the unsafe consequences and dangers of decisions
ever more controllable; accidents could occur, as long as and because they
were considered compensatible. If the climate has changed irreversibly, if
progress in human genetics makes irreversible interventions in human
existence possible, if terrorist groups already have weapons of mass
destruction available to them, then it is too late. Given this new quality of
‘threats to humanity’ – argues Francois Ewald – the logic of compensation
breaks down and is replaced by the principle of precaution through
prevention. Not only is prevention taking precedence over compensation, we
are also trying to anticipate and prevent risks whose existence has not been
proven. (2006:334, 2011:665)
Beck (2006) discusses that the irony of risk is that we cannot calculate and control the
risks, neither can we rely on experiences from the past; therefore, the effort of monetary
compensation would not function after a worst accident and failure. Risks caused by
industrial hazards and damages that we encounter in the risk society are beyond our
estimation and remain uncertain and obfuscated in the calculation of accidents (Beck
1992). This is why Beck (2006) argues that risk is ambivalence (330). In the process of
industrialization, we have prepared for the worst case by calculation and control.
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However, what we still encounter is “the discovery of the importance of non-knowing”
(Beck 2011). After the discovery, we attempt to renew, deepen and expand our
knowledge, control and security, but the irony of risk is that we still have to deal with
something we do not know if it exists (Beck 2011).
Perrow (1984) has a similar argument based on risks in our industrialized society.
When he discusses accidents in our technological systems, he labels them as high-risk
systems because these systems have high possibilities to cause accidents. Those accidents
caused within the high-risk systems are called normal accidents by Perrow; since the
systems which people have been dealing with are very complicated, people cannot avoid
accidents associated with those highly technological systems. Thus, according to Perrow
(1984), accidents are inevitable and people can expect them to happen normally.
Beck (1986) claims that the notion of risk is directly related to the notion of
reflexive modernization. Beck (1986) states that modernization is becoming “reflexive; it
is becoming its own theme” (19). This implies that questions of the development and
employment of technologies are deeply covered by questions of the political and
economic ‘management’ of the risks of technologies (Beck 1986). The manufactured
uncertainty stems from decision making processes and “endogenous entities” (Mythen
2004:16) which are practiced by people, firms, state agencies, and also politicians (Beck
1992). As opposed to the threat and natural hazards which people used to encounter,
these manufactured risks happen in the process of development of modernization (Beck
1986; Mythen 2004). The manufactured uncertainty does not happen accidentally, but
systematically, caused by the basic institutions of science, firms, the states, and even the
military (Beck 2006). Reflexive modernization means that “we are not living in a post-
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modern world, but in a more-modern world. It is not the crisis, but the victory of
modernity, which, through the logics of unintended and unknown side-effects,
undermines basic institutions of first modernity” (Beck 2006; 338). The manufactured
risks and uncertainty with the threats of encountering not-knowing side effects and
unpredictable cause could not be interpreted as an onward process or positive experience
for further development of modernity, but it is reflexive, something we need to deal with
in return.
Beck (1986) continues his argument with paying attention to the nuclear age
understanding that nuclear energy has catastrophic potential because of its effect on large
segments of the population. It does not matter how small an accident would be because
the effects would be too large, and one accident implies annihilation (Beck 1986). Beck
(1987) published an article shortly after the nuclear accident at Chernobyl and discusses
the nuclear age that we live in and its risks. He argues that the accident at Chernobyl
makes us conscious about the nuclear age and what has been threatening us for a long
time (Beck 1987). According to him, our relation to reality has been fundamentally
transformed because of “the industrial universalization of chemical poisons in the air, the
water, and foodstuff as well” (155) along with the nuclear age. The accident of Chernobyl
is one of the great examples which represent the nuclear age and its risks which we
encounter. Beck (1987) argues that the nuclear age symbolizes “the end of perceptiveness
and the beginning of a social construction of risk realities” (156). People have been
depending on the success of scientific and technical-economic development, but at the
same time, this development has just been a construction of risk itself.
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In terms of de-localization, the cause of radiation does not have a limit. Space,
time and social differentiation have gone beyond those limits; therefore, the effects of the
accident at Chernobyl can last for a very long period, and they can be a global
phenomenon (Beck 1987). The consequences of Chernobyl disaster are incalculableness
and non-compensatibility; although people have prepared for the worst-case scenario, the
probability of such a disaster cannot covered in the usual way by an insurance company,
because the cause was something they did not anticipate, and could not anticipate; they
did not exactly know how to deal with the situation. This would have to be based on “the
scientific utopia” (Beck 2006;334, 2011;665) which makes the unsafe consequences and
dangers controllable.
Perrow (1984) also argues that living with high-risk systems (nuclear power,
nuclear weapons and recombinant DNA) implies that we live with catastrophic potential
for those victims who are innocent bystanders and future generations; therefore, it would
be possible to have no boundaries to these catastrophes in terms of space and time. In
addition, once the risks associated with the nuclear energy happened in reality, the way
they deal with it is significantly influenced by those who determine decisions politically,
economically, and socially.
In this risk society, what we have been experiencing has global effects, therefore
even people who live in other nations cannot speak of it as “the internal affairs of another
country” (Beck 1987:159). The argument of Beck on risk society emphasizes that risks
are byproducts of what we have decided in the process of industrial and economic
development. Our society has been developed with the efforts of improving our lives
technologically and scientifically; however, it contains risks which have global effects
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and do not have limitation in time and space. Even people who are outside of a nation
need to be seriously considered. For example, we have been experiencing the economic
and industrial usefulness of nuclear power, but we do not have any solutions to deal with
the contamination of vegetables and milk (Beck 1987). The standards of normality and
the basis for calculating accidents are abolished in a risk society (Beck 1992). This leads
to a question of its effects like the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
One important feature of risk society is that its concept is highly, and almost only,
related to high levels of modern technology and industrialization. This means that some
of the highly-industrialized countries are considered risk societies, but some other
developing countries are not. Beck’s concept of risk society helps us understand highly
industrialized society with nuclear power like Japan and existing great differences
between those with modern technology and those unable to afford modern technology.
His concept is very important to facilitate understanding when comparing societies of
Haiti and Japan.
Theoretical Approach: World-System Perspective
When a natural disaster occurs, a low-income country with less economic stability
and resources, as well as an ill-equipped organizational structure, would experience
greater consequences, and the country would start to experience severe difficulties in the
disaster response and recovery (Rodrigues and Russell 2006). Compared to a low-income
country, a high-income country would have fewer difficulties in a shorter recovery period
because of its economic stability and extensive social and political structure. Rodrigues
and Russell (2006) conclude there are differences between low-income and high-income
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countries in response to a disaster due to the social and political structures, economic
opportunities, and demographic characteristics.
Collins (2009) argues that vulnerability to disaster could happen due to
underdevelopment, which is defined as “a situation in which poverty creates both social
and economic susceptibility” (28). Importantly, Collins (2009) discusses that
vulnerability can also be induced by development as well. It is not only
underdevelopment, but also development can possibly increase disaster risk or human
vulnerabilities due to, for example, mass displacements through industrialization, social
and economic collapse, and environmental degradation; therefore, both development and
underdevelopment contain possibilities to create risks and vulnerabilities caused by
disaster events (Collins 2009).
Although uneven relations between the low-income and high-income nations
would cause the increasing vulnerabilities in the low-income nations, the high-income
nations also face the challenge of reducing disaster risks (Collins 2009). Since disaster
risks have their origins in global economic crises or macro-environmental processes, it is
especially the high-income nations which could face a disaster covering a large part of
the world on short notice (Collins 2009). Therefore, it is significantly necessary to
maintain an assumption that it is not only low-income nations which encounter severe
difficulties in responding to a disaster, but also high-income nations due to their highly
industrialized social structure. In addition, Oliver-Smith (2013) states “disaster risk and
social vulnerability are in large measure the products of historical and existing processes
of social and economic development” (280). Oliver-Smith’s ideas indicate the importance
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of pursuing a historical approach to a current disaster event, and a holistic idea of its
social environment.
In this context, the focus of this study is to understand how historical events
inform a nation’s current position and disaster vulnerability today. This study compares
Japan and Haiti’s response to the earthquakes. Their positions in the world-economy can
help understand the different social conditions after the earthquakes in Haiti and Japan.
Wallerstein’s world-system analysis explains and facilitates understanding the
different paths of development between Japan and Haiti. Wallerstein’s world-system
analysis is a theoretical approach which provides understandings of relational concepts
between each nation’s positions in the world-economy and the process of how it has
reached its positions. One of the important aspects of world-system analysis is that it
emphasizes the significance of historical analysis; it requires a long-term, large-scale, and
holistic approach to examine social occurrences (Jang 2004).
Wallerstein (1974) describes a world-economy as “a single division of labor but
multiple polities and cultures” (31). In the world-system perspective, the world is unified
by neither political nor cultural hegemony. On the other hand, the world-economy
contains many political systems, cultures, and ethnic groups including religion, language,
and traditions (Wallerstein 1974; 2004). Instead of political power or cultural hegemony
to unify the world economy, what unifies the world as a structure is the division of labor
which connects the world internally in a large geographic zone (Wallerstein 2004).
Wallerstein (1979) argues that the concept of class, such as bourgeois and
proletarian, is historically developed with its specific background of the capitalist mode
of social organization. Class analysis is only meaningful when it is perceived from and
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within the historical context (Wallerstein 1979). World-system analysis points out wage
labor is only one of the many factors of labor control within a capitalist system; instead, it
is the class struggle and all other kinds of social struggles which should be understood
and evaluated in the world-system as a whole (Wallerstein 2004).
The inequitable relationship between nations in the world-economy is at the
center of world-system analysis. The theoretical concepts of core and periphery processes
indicate the position of a nation in the world-system, and its distribution is founded
geographically through the process of exploitation of periphery and unequal exchange by
core nations (Prew 2010).
Unequal exchange occurs due to an axial division of labor between core-like
production processes and peripheral production processes, and the core-like production
processes are high profit (Wallerstein 2004). Under world-system analysis, the
production processes determine core-like or peripheral-like status instead of the state,
political, or cultural hegemony (Wallerstein 2004).
Under the notion of the world-system perspective, unequal exchange, which is a
structure of world economy, produces international inequality (Mahutga 2006). From
unequal exchange, core nations maintain advantages over periphery nations, and the
international division of labor allows those powerful nations to maintain control over
other nations in a world-economy because a capitalist world-economy separates
productions into core-like and peripheral products (Prew 2010; Mahutga 2006;
Wallerstein 2004). As a result, unequal exchange between core-like and periphery-like
products results in a flow of surplus-value to the core and providing a large amount of
profit from multiple local producers (Wallerstein 1974; 2004).
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In the framework of the capitalist world-economy, the major characteristics of
core nations are high wage, high technology, and high-profit. On the other hand, the
characteristics of peripheral nations are lower wage, low technology, low-profit, and less
diversified production (Wallerstein 1979). Under the core-periphery relational concept of
world-system perspective, periphery nations are usually subject to greater competition
because products are in a weak position in the market in the process of exchange
compared to quasi-monopolized products, which core nations produce (Wallerstein
2004). Because of unequal exchange, those periphery nations become weaker in the
world-economic system when core nations replace their products with more advanced
technology (Prew 2010; Wallerstein 2004).
Periphery nations tend to be weaker and have less ability to influence surplus
value in the market since capital is concentrated in the core areas which acquire the
abilities to create strong state-machineries based on both the financial base and the
political strength (Wallerstein 1983). Those core nations are able to pressure weaker
nations to accept rules related to lower down the hierarchy of commodity chains,
including lower-paid-work-forces and household structures to permit such work-forces to
survive (Wallerstein 1983: 31). These were the paths to historical levels of wages which
has created significant divergence and unequal exchange between areas in the worldsystem (Wallerstein 1983). Wallerstein (1983) argues that these processes are usually
hidden, and prices of commodities are likely to be negotiated in a world market based on
the structural hierarchy and economic forces.
In the core nations under the world-system, Prew (2010) points out that the
process of high technology in core nations is designed to increase the rate of profit for
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further economic expansion by increasing production efficiency. Utilizing energy
intensive machines and the speed of production lines are examples of substituting human
labor in order to increase efficiency (Prew 2010). This implies that in core nations,
technology is substituted for natural processes, and they try to maintain the rate of
production by being very energy intensive including the use of natural resources, such as
carbon dioxide emitting resources like natural gas, oil, and coal (Prew 2010).
In an effort to produce more commodities with greater efficiency, core nations
face the increase of environmental degradation through increasing efficiency with their
advanced technologies (Prew 2010). Prew (2010) points out that “The existence of high
technology and quasi-monopolies characteristic of core processes are a necessity to
facilitate economic expansion and core dominance, but result in the more intensive use of
nature’s products” (168). There is a strong correlation between development of
technology, industrialization, and its effects toward the environment.
The division of the world-economy into nations characterized by core processes
and others by periphery processes provides one of the fundamental social circumstances
influencing the effect of disasters on society. Core processes as high technology, are
precisely the context of industrial societies that produce the risk (Beck 2006) that lead to
“normal accidents” (Perrow 1984). Core or periphery status in the world-system provides
a social context of disaster as outlined by Oliver-Smith (1994). Given that core nations
are dominated by high technology, disasters should be influenced by these core
processes. Likewise, the low technology, peripheral nature of other nations will influence
the outcome of their disasters.
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As Collins (2009) discusses that both development and underdevelopment contain
possibilities to create risks and vulnerabilities due to their developmental characteristics.
Looking at historical processes of Haiti and Japan, which are two very different countries
under the concept of the world-system perspective, would lead to different outcomes in
the society after the earthquake. Utilizing the world-system analysis can aid the
interpretation of different effects of the earthquakes on each country.
Historical Background of Haiti
Considering Haiti’s history, Beckford (1972) argues Haiti’s plantation system is a
historical process underlying its “persistent poverty.” In order to view a plantation as a
system with the purpose of exploitation, Beckford (1972) points out two main systematic
dimensions. They include the internal dimension which refers to a social system within a
nation, and the external dimension which refers to an economic system both within a
nation and in wider world communities (Beckford 1972). In the external dimension of an
economic system, two characteristics are interrelated which are a nation’s export
orientation and foreign ownership (Beckford 1972). Beckford (1972) argues that
plantations were/are “the product of metropolitan capital and enterprise” (11), and it
implies that plantations are sources of macro level economics with a variety of ways. A
plantation within a nation is only a part of metropolitan capital which bonds to a wide
world of economics and industries, and they consist of a set of economic relations at the
macro level (Beckford 1972). Therefore, Beckford (1972) argues that “plantations are
dependent” (11) on the relations of controlling and being controlled in terms of property
ownership, financial decisions, and political connections.

26
Beckford (1972) argues that societies like those in the Caribbean were comprised
of less organized indigenous populations which allowed European invaders to destroy
their societies and massacre their populations. Wallerstein (1974; 1980) also points out
that Northwest Europe emerged as a core area first in the world economy and Eastern
Europe and the Western Hemisphere were once peripheral areas. Nations with more
power sought to feed on weaker colonial powers because it was an easy way to take and
obtain the economic advantages already established by the nations. In the case of Haiti,
the authoritarian ruling structure was established and reinforced by the French (Shamsie
and Thompson, 2006).
France maintained Haiti as a colony until 1794, the year France abolished slavery
(Dubois 2012, Trouillot 1990). Girard (2005) notes that Haiti was France’s most valued
colony since a half of Europe’s consumption of sugar and coffee was dependent on
Haitian exports, especially when the French Revolution started. Coffee exports increased
tremendously and were sold in the Western world. By 1859, Haiti was the fourth largest
coffee producer in the world after Brazil, Java, and Ceylon, and 70% of coffee exports
were constituted by Haiti (Sheller 2000). Haiti had world production records for both
sugar and coffee, which made it the most profitable colony in the world from the point of
view of French mercantilists (Trouillot 1990). Other small exports were cacao, indigo,
molasses, hides, tortoise, horns, and wax (Sheller 2000).
Although Haiti is one of the unique nations which acquired independence from
France after the revolution, their failure of self-autonomy and political and civil control
are often discussed (Sheller 2000). Beckford (1972) points out that, many times, forces
inherent in the plantation system when its destruction occurred do not have a strong effect
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on developing self-autonomy. The French control in Haiti’s plantation system did not
result in developing Haiti’s self-control in terms of political, economic, and civil control;
instead, the result was the modification of its system rather than total destruction of
French forces (Beckford 1972). Beckford (1972) argues that the modification had effects
on materialistic improvement in the plantation society, but it usually hardly changed
people’s basic psychological and cultural dispossession. Revolution like Haiti’s success
had not fully facilitated Haiti to develop its own political, economic, and cultural control
because of the “dynamic equilibrium of underdevelopment” (Beckford 1972:213) that is
prevalent in a plantation society.
After Haiti won independence in 1804, the small number of elites, who were
likely to be mulattos, in the capital retained their French culture while the majority of
populations who were peasants retained their African culture and religion (Mitchelle
1967; Sheller 2000). Sheller (2000) points out the post-independence government in Haiti
was mostly occupied by those elites who spoke French and followed French
philosophical tradition and culture. The gap between the elites and local black
populations stemmed from imbued sense of national and racial identity existing among
those lighter skinned elites (Trouillot 1990). Those lighter skinned elites, who were likely
to be mulattoes and their progeny, treated local blacks with disrespect while maintaining
the political power and right to prescribing those local blacks (Trouillot 1990). Trouillot
(1990) discusses that Haiti’s political independence only increased the gap between those
leaders and producers. The disagreements between those two groups were about both the
politics and the land (Trouillt 1990, Caster 1992).
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Although they have achieved independence, the illiteracy rate remains one of the
highest in the world largely since there was no public school at that time (Mitchelle
1967). Education was mostly based on the French style, and those who were able to
receive it were only elites (Mitchelle 1967). There was a big gap between elites and
peasants in terms of education, economics, and culture in Haiti, and the majority of
Haiti’s population, peasants, remained illiterate (Mitchelle 1967).
Beckford (1972) considers the entry of the United States into the Caribbean and
Central America as the new imperialism for the purpose of searching for raw materials.
The imperialism of the United States had a significant effect on Haiti’s plantation
economy in the twentieth century (Beckford 1972). Sugar had been produced in Haiti
during and after the French colonization, but it was especially during the United States’
occupation between 1915 and 1934 when the United States’ expansion of the sugar
plantation industries, and plantations, were developed (Beckford 1972).
The occupation of the United States into the Caribbean area started with
commercial adventures but also included territorial acquisitions and political intervention
as well as military invasions (Schmidt 1971). Schmidt (1971) discusses that the presence
of the United States in Haiti was materialistic rather than idealistic. America’s efforts to
civilize Haiti were to achieve material and technical development, to enhance
organizational efficiency, and to develop a pragmatic attitude rather than spiritual
(Schmidt 1971). The United States’ occupation enhanced the construction of roads,
hospitals, and public buildings, but the efforts of the United States were largely
unsuccessful due to racial and cultural prejudices and tensions which impeded the
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development of a relationship between masters and disciples (Schmidt 1972, Trouillot
1990).
Trouillot (1990) points out Haiti’s two major economic problems caused by the
occupation of the US. During the US occupation, it increased economic dependence by
expanding coffee exporting business, and it also increased the injustice in the fiscal
system; the US raised the share of the value of both imports and exports through customs
duties (Trouillot 1990). Haiti’s economic situation was worse in the end of the US
occupation compared to earlier (Trouillot 1990). Between 1916 to 1921 and 1932 to
1933, coffee increased its value from 67 percent of exports to 78 percent; this implies that
it increased the dependence on commodity products instead of several other
products/crops cultivated by a few other plantation groups (Trouillot 1990).
Coffee occupied 74 percent of all the exports at that time (Trouillot 1990).
Trouillot (1990) argues that the US also benefited from Haiti facing a trade deficit since
the US remained one of the major source of Haiti’s imports. In the final year of the US
occupation, custom duties had an important role for the government; it provided 80 to 83
percent of government revenues (Trouillot 1990). Import duties increased from 23
percent of the value of the merchandise in 1916 to 1917 to 46 percent in 1932 to 1933,
which implied the US was forcing the burden on the producers and buyers of Haiti
(Trouillot 1990). Export duties also increased from 19 percent to 28 percent in the same
period (Trouillot 1990). This fact indicated that the tax burden on the peasantry and the
lower classes was significantly heavier during the US occupation compared to the
nineteenth century (Truillot 1990). Truillot (1990) discusses “dependence and the
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extraction of a massive quantity of peasant surplus by nonproducers” (103) as Haiti’s
most important economic problem under the US occupation, economic centralization
Economic centralization was one of the significant results of the US occupation.
(Truillot 1990). It increased the role for Port-au-Prince which supplied 47 percent of
customs receipts, meaning 69 percent of imports and 23 percent of exports, by the fiscal
year 1932-1933; this was greater compared to less than 30 percent before the occupation
(Truillot 1990). Truillot (1990) discusses that this economic centralization encouraged
the homogenization of merchant and political groups in the capital and to reinforce their
power. This was also when military started to gain more power (Truillot 1990). Emphasis
on economic improvement, imports and exports, had been stressed during the US
occupation of Haiti along with its increase of political and military power.
In 1920s and after World War II, Haiti had been more dependent on external
funding along with its decline of agriculture and capitalist enclaving (Castor 1992). Haiti
had not been able to build an agro-industrial infrastructure to develop their overall
economy, nor achieve autonomy (Castor 1992). Assembly industries had grown since the
1970s, but they did not make much difference. The utilization of an accumulation model
based on super-exploitation of labor, which contained low wages, no social security, and
prohibition of bargaining rights, had not led to an improvement in Haiti’s economy, and it
caused a struggle to survive under the difficult conditions and lack of revenue (Castor
1992).
Kawakita (2016) also argues that although Haiti is one of the unique nations
which acquired independence from France after the revolution, it did not have the
prospect for development of its own economy and autonomy. Haiti’s future was limited
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because its revolution was only anti-world-system within the great force of the worldsystem. Also, Westerners in the plantations, living either with plantation workers or not,
was an important aspect to move to a semi-periphery position from the periphery since its
infrastructure was more likely to be developed by those Westerners, like the colonial
history of the US for example (Kawakita 2016). Haiti’s land was only used for
plantations without developing its infrastructure, and it was a portion of the reasons it
remained as a periphery after the revolution (Kawakita 2016).
Haiti as a Periphery Country
Haiti is currently the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere (World
FactBook 2014). 80% of population are living under the poverty line, and 54% in abject
poverty (World FactBook 2014). Several factors influence the severe poverty and hinder
the country’s development. Haiti’s life expectancy at birth is 63.1 years old, which is
slightly lower than other Caribbean countries at 74.6 years old (World Bank 2013). Their
unemployment rate is 40.6 %. People who do not have formal jobs occupy more than
two-thirds of the labor force (World FactBook 2014). Their current severe situation is
significantly related to Haiti’s colonial past which has negatively affected it politically
and economically.
Regarding the division of wealth and poverty, differences of power and access to
opportunities directly influence the development of human capital and society. According
to the world-system perspective, a major feature of periphery countries is that they are
politically weakest compared to other core and semi-periphery countries (Wallerstein
1980). Haiti’s current situation reflects the criterion of periphery nations that argues the
ruling groups in core and semi-periphery nations seeking to maintain their control of
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periphery nations’ production and employment (Wallerstein 1980). This factor maintains
Haiti as one of the periphery countries struggling to develop its autonomy. The core and
semi-periphery nations retain their ruling control in periphery nations simply because
they continue to need certain products which they ecologically find difficult to extract on
their own land and also because of the cost of labor which is significantly lower than in
the core or semi-periphery nations (Wallerstein 1980). The relations with core nations
maintain periphery nations in the condition of underdevelopment. Even though Haiti is
one of the unique nations succeeded in its independence and abolition of slavery, its
relation to the core nations, especially France and the United States, had a significant
effect on their political, economic, and social situation today. Haiti is a periphery nation
which struggles with significant difficulties in developing its own political and economic
stabilities for its growth.
Historical Background of Japan
In the discussion of Japanese development and modernization process, the Meiji
Restoration was often argued to be a focal point of Japanese economic development
(Tabb 1995; Hirakawa 1989; Crawcour 1989). Before the Meiji Restoration, Japan was a
closed nation for about 200 years under the Tokugawa Regime (Tabb 1995). In 1640,
Japan closed its country and ended all foreign contacts except for a small regulated Dutch
trading port at Nagasaki (Tabb 1995). Other than the trade with Dutch, Japan had been
avoiding interactions with most of the foreign countries and afraid of being explored,
which Tabb (1995) points out that Japan was the only nation in the world to avoid being
dominated by Western imperialism.
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Before the Meiji Restoration in 1868, premodern Japan was basically a feudal
society and typical preindustrial Asian country (Crawcour 1989). According to Crawcour
(1989), the population in the 1800s was approximately 30 to 33 million; some 80 to 85
percent of this population lived in rural villages. Conversely, about 2 million lived in
three large cities which were Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto. For the administrative purpose
under Tokugawa, most of the population was divided by four major classes; samurai,
farmers, artisans, and merchants (Crawcour 1989).
When Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Japan with the American navy’s
Black Ships in 1853, he forced Japan to open the country and imposed unequal treaties.
When the Tokugawa Regime was threatened by a foreign country, it started its collapse
(Tabb 1995; Chen 2000). Japan was the country which had been isolated for about 250
years and had not been invaded for 1,200 years (Tabb 1995). The approach of Perry, the
foreign military power followed by diplomats and merchants (Cohen 2000), had given
Japan a powerful motivation to reconsider their own governance and how they needed to
prepare for further approaches from the foreign countries.
Japan actively began learning from the Westerners. They started visiting major
nations of the world including the United States and Europe (Tabb 1995). The Iwakura
Mission had more than 100 members, and they traveled about a year and nine months
(Tabb 1995). What the Westerners made them realize was that radical and fundamental
changes were needed for Japan to allow them to catch up with the Western countries and
stand on an equal footing with them in terms of technological innovation and increasing
knowledge of international politics and culture (Tabb 1995). Iwakura, in fact, was a
shrewd judge of current events and Japan’s possibilities (Jansen 1989). He wrote that “to
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restore national prestige and handle the foreigners, the country would have to be united
and ‘for policy and administration to have a single source, the Court must be made the
center of national government’” (Jansen 1989:353).
The contact with the West and the efforts of the significant leaders in Choshu and
Satsuma resulted in the Meiji Restoration. The Meiji Restoration was the period when the
old orders, the tradition bound Tokugawa period, were transformed, and it brought
significant social changes in many ways (Tabb 1995). Under the Meiji governance, Japan
developed “public administration, maintained a top-down paternalism with strong
remnants of a feudalistic sense of obligation, devotion to duty, and hard work, patriotism,
nationalism, mercantile regulation, and subsidy to promote industrial growth” (Tabb
1995: 64). In addition, the Meiji governance created a strong central authority improving
their national military power (Cohen 2000).
According to Iriye (1989), Japan was transforming itself as a modern state during
1868 to 1912 under the Meiji emperor’s rule. This was the time when Japan was
reforming and establishing social structures to be a modern state. The internal
administrator, Tokugawa regime, was totally replaced with the new Tokyo government
which established a bureaucratic structure (Iriye 1989). The new ruling elites in the
government were mostly former samurai who had been active in former bakufu
(government) before the restoration and who had been to Western countries to study to
help establish new bureaucratic institutions in Japan, such as the ministries of Finance,
Home Affairs, and Foreign Affairs (Iriye 1989). One of the features of this replacement
was to have the Tokyo government as a central authority of Japan administratively and
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politically, instead of the old ways of localism, so that all the experts and professional
bureaucrats would be able to play an important role (Iriye 1989).
Stressing administrative centralization was another important key for developing
a national economy (Iriye 1989). The Meiji government focused on proving national
leadership for national development in order for the country as a whole to “increase
production and create industry” (729); this was one of the slogans at that time (Iriye
1989). As administrative roles, they reformed taxation to gain revenue from the
agricultural sector and utilize it for industrialization; merchants and industrialists were
protected by the government so that they established model industries and provided a
quality inspection station (Iriye 1989). People were taught the idea of “enriching the
country and strengthening its defense” (729) while establishing corporations in the new
policies (Iriye 1989).
Iriye (1989) discusses several important points which the behavior of Japan
during the Meiji governance fitted into the general patterns of the modern Western states.
Strengthening their military power was one of the patterns of the modern states, and what
was unique about Japan was to be the first non-Western state which recognized military
and imperialistic powers (Iriye 1989). While mass incorporation had been growing, the
government attempted to strengthen the military in order to have it as a backbone of the
modern Japanese nation (Iriye 1989). The government focused on including educated and
enlightened citizens in the military; therefore, education was highly emphasized in
school, political, and professional activities (Iriye 1989).
Another important behavior of Japan which fitted into the pattern of modern states
was a territorial entity (Iriye 1989). In terms of geographical entry from center to
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periphery, Japan established clear national boundaries from the north, Hokkaido, and to
the south, Ryukyu (Iriye 1989). Establishing effective foreign policies and revising
treaties with Korea and China with the aim to fully mobilize domestic resources was
possible with the power in a modern state (Iriye 1989).
The fear of the power of the West was also one of the factors which gathered
people together for the restoration and started opening of the country for modernization.
Iriye (1989) analyzes that in the process of modernization, Japan had learned from many
nations by modeling the patterns of national development. The models were not only
found in one nation, but include Britain, Germany, France, and the United States (Iriye
1989). Tabb (1995) points out that Japanese economic development was achieved
through learning from the West while maintaining Japanese styles and cultural aspects of
collective norms and spirit. Japan maintained its pride in Japanese identity, unity, and
purity which were symbolized by the emperor (Tabb 1995).
Another focal point of Japanese development is argued to be after World War II
when Japan attempted to recover from the loss caused by losing the war. After the end of
WWII to March 1952, Japan was under the occupation of the United States and lost their
sovereignty and self-control over the nation (Inkster 2001). The control over the Japanese
nation was in the hands of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, SCAP
(Inkster 2001). One of SCAP’s first foci was to destroy the Japanese military potential of
their industries; SCAP focused on the destruction of Japanese imperialism and abolition
of the armed forces. SCAP introduced a highly progressive property tax, the fostering of
democratic and labor institutions, the liberalization of the educational system, and the
amendment of the election laws of to allow female suffrage (Inkster 2001). The land
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reform of 1947 and the anti-trust and anti-zaibatsu laws were other important changes
(Inkster 2001). These profound institutional innovations right after WWII had an effect
on the Japanese economy and development (Inkster 2001).
Some scholars argue that foundation of Japan’s rise after WWII was the low-cost
raw materials which Japanese firms turned into cars, ships, electronics, and other
industrial products; these contributed to Japanese economic development (Ciccantell and
Bunker 1995; 2005). Japanese firms were supported by the United States and World
Bank financial assistance which created an industrial development plan based on steel,
shipbuilding, and shipping industries (Ciccantell and Bunker 2005). The steel industry
provided the raw material foundation, and it reduced the cost for many other sectors of
the Japanese economy (Ciccantell and Bunker 2005). Ciccantell and Bunker (2005) argue
that this transformed Japan into the world’s second largest economy and the United
States’ economic competitor. Also, the high rate of importing raw materials and the
interactions with other industrial nations allowed a fast-growing Japanese economy
(Inkster 2001).
Japan shared in the golden age years from 1952 to 1973. This period was when
Japan experienced unprecedented growth and prosperity for one of the advanced nations
(Inkster 2001). The advanced nations, stimulated by industrialization, experienced high
growth in national income, national income per head, manufacturing, capital formation,
labor productivity, and exports (Inkster 2001). By the end of 1980s, Japan had become
the world’s largest creditor and exporter of capital (Inkster 2001).
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Japan as a Core Country
Wallerstein (2002) argues Japan is one of the last nations among all other nations
to incorporate into the capitalist world-economy. Pointing out the major focal point of
Japan’s development which was the corruption of Tokugawa regime and the rise of the
Meiji Restoration, Japan’s entry of capitalist world-economy happened during the
nineteenth century (Wallerstein 2002). During this period, they allowed the entry of the
West into Japan, and Japanese elites attempted to rapidly change within the nation
(Wallerstein 2002). They had to seek ways to defend themselves and gain an advantage
in the modern world-system (Wallerstein 2002). Having learned from Western countries,
the actions they took were the “selective import of ‘modern’ technologies, economic and
political, to create a regime that would not be entirely submerged by outside pressure;
and the creation of a modern military structure” (Wallerstein 2002: 1). Also, Kawakita
(2016) points out that the period when Japan was closed and ended all foreign contact,
like the Soviet Union with its Iron Curtain, it remained in a semi-periphery position in the
world-system.
What was unique about Japan’s entry of capitalist world-system was that instead
of allowing the Western powers to invade the nation, Japan became one of the “carvers”
who defeated China in 1895, won a war with Russia, conquered Korea, declared war on
Germany in 1914, and joined the First World War (Wallerstein 2002). In addition, by the
time of the Second World War, Japan possessed a major world military power
(Wallerstein 2002). The defeat of the Second World War was a terrible loss and
impairment to Japan which resulted in a substantial loss of Japanese people, massive
devastation caused by atomic bombing, and the destruction of a part of their industrial
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infrastructure (Wallerstain 2002). The defeat and the U.S. control led to a significant
change in the Japanese military and an introduction of a liberal parliamentary regime
(Wallerstein 2002).
Wallerstein (2002) points out the needs of the U.S. in the Cold War with the
Soviet Union was an opportunity and advantage for Japan to grow their economy; and in
25 years, Japan grew from being a semi-periphery country to one of the core countries
joining the economic giants of the world-economy (Wallerstein 2002). Since this
transformation was extremely rapid and extraordinary, it is impossible to reverse their
position in the world although Japan had experienced economic difficulties in 1990s,
which did not cause the nation to change their position as playing a major role in
capitalist accumulation in the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein 2002).
Today, Japan stands as the fourth largest economy in the world after China which
stands in first place and India, the third as of 2014 (World FactBook 2014). Having a life
expectancy rate at birth of 84.74 years, Japan is one of the top countries where people
live very long (World FactBook 2014). At the same time, one of Japan’s current concerns
is its low birth rate which is 1.4 children born per woman in her lifetime (World
FactBook 2014). Japan’s unemployed rate in ages from 15 to 24 is 7.9% (World
FactBook 2014). Currently Prime Minister Abe is attempting to gradually raise the
consumption tax rate; the government raised it from 5% to 8% in 2014 and is still aiming
to rise it to 10% in order to help government revenue so that they are able to plan to
reform the economy and deal with the large government debt (World FactBook 2014).
Currently, low-birth rate, a large aging population, and shrinking population are Japan’s
major challenges for their economy (World FactBook 2014).
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METHODOLOGY
In this study, comparative-historical method is utilized with the focus of withincase method including a subtype of causal narrative. Comparative-historical method has
several advantages which “employ comparison as means of gaining insight into causal
determinations” (Lange 2013:14), and “pursue causal explanation, and analyze units of
analysis at the meso- or macro-level” (19). In order to examine macro level of causal
explanation of how experiences of the earthquakes will differ in society of Haiti and
Japan, comparative-historical method is an effective approach to provide a holistic idea
and background to each country’s society today with their different experiences with the
earthquakes.
Causal narrative is “a detective-style within-case method and an analytic
technique that explores the causes of a particular social phenomenon through a narrative
analysis; that is, it is a narrative that explores what caused something” (Lange 2013: 43;
117). With the focus of causal narrative, this research attempts to examine and explore
the causes of different experiences to the earthquakes in Haiti and Japan. Also,
Wallerstein’s world-system perspective is the main theoretical framework to examine the
different historical processes of Haiti and Japan, and to investigate historical origins and
explanation to the different disaster experiences. The focus is to seek a holistic
explanation to current situations to each county with utilizing the role and notion of core
and periphery in world-system perspective.
Data Collection
The sources for conducting this research are collected from historical documents
from both primary and secondary sources. The majority of primary data is collected from
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the government documents which determine specific statistics of loss and damages
caused by the earthquakes in terms of population, economics, and social and individual
effects, such as housing and infrastructure in communities. The secondary sources are
collected from scholarly research literature on the earthquakes that occurred in both Haiti
and Japan, as well as newspaper articles, print media, government documents, ledgers,
and books published after the earthquakes. From those secondary sources, this research
will also seek to discuss differences of the social and political structure, economic
opportunities, and demographic characteristics based on the assumption of different
outcomes which already existed historically between core and periphery countries.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Earthquake in Haiti and Problems Caused
The 7.0 Haiti Earthquake occurred on January 12, 2010, and it struck very close
to the capital, Port au Prince. It caused a death toll of over 220,000 people (2% of the
population) and about 300,000 people were injured (World Bank 2011; IASC 2010). The
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2010) points out that these numbers of deaths,
injuries, and homelessness caused by the earthquake were far greater than in other recent
cases of devastating earthquakes such as the earthquake in China which had a 7.9
magnitude in 2008, a 6.3 earthquake in Italy in 2009, and an 8.8 earthquake in Chile in
2010. Because it occurred in the highly populated urban area with few earthquake
resistant buildings, the earthquake in Haiti was more destructive (IASC 2010).
According to United Nations (2011), the estimated number of people who were
displaced was 2.3 million people including 302,000 children. Due to the earthquake, at
least 188,383 houses were severely damaged and 105,000 were destroyed, including 80
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percent of schools in Port-au-Prince and 60 percent of schools in the South and West
districts (United Nations 2011). Approximately, 30,000 commercial and public buildings,
such as government buildings, municipal administration buildings, and the Port-au-Prince
Cathedral, were severely damaged as well (IASC 2010). The communications
infrastructure was considerably damaged, including many debris blocked roads, and
damage to submarine telecommunications cable (IASC 2010). In addition, Haiti’s health
system was damaged. Sixty percent of the hospitals were either severely damaged or
destroyed, and the only national teaching and reference hospital and the Ministry of
Health building were not spared, causing the deaths of more than 200 staff (IASC 2010).
The earthquake caused a loss and urgent reconstruction cost of about $11.5 billion
since it destroyed about 80% of Port-au-Prince (International 2010). According to the
March 2010 Post Disaster Needs Assessment, the estimated damages and losses of the
country was $7.8 billion with reconstruction needs of $11.5 billion. Haiti’s earthquake
resulted in the highest economic cost caused by a disaster in the last 35 years (World
Bank 2011). When the earthquake struck, Haiti was already suffering and recovering
from storms in 2008 which caused 800 deaths and over $1 billion in damages
(International 2010); therefore, the earthquake continued to make more people suffer due
to the severe poverty and increased number of crimes, such as violence and sexual abuse
in Port-au-Prince (International 2010).
Regarding those problems caused by the earthquake, Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (2010) argued that considerable issues already existed in Haiti prior to the
earthquake. For example, urbanization in the city and metropolitan area in Port-au-Prince,
a lack of skills in the building of concrete structures, a lack of ability to maintain old and
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aging buildings, and the non-reinforcement of building codes were already serious
problems (IASC 2010). Other problems included a lack of control and regulation over
self- and contractor-built constructions, a lack of land use and urban planning, as well as
a lack of knowledge of risk zoning (IASC 2010). All of these problems had triggered
increases in vulnerability of the urban areas (IASC 2010). Roads in slums were unpaved
or easily damaged during the annually rainy season, and most of them did not even have
a road system (IASC 2010).
The problems caused by the earthquake in Haiti were countless. Haiti experienced
one of the most devastating earthquakes which caused significant human costs including
many displaced people, destroyed infrastructure, and impaired functioning of its
government. The important key associating this earthquake and the country is that Haiti
had already been suffering its own issues. The issues were deprivation and vulnerability
which have been caused by a high poverty rate, high unemployment rate, and being an
economically and politically weak country. The 2010 earthquake occurred in the social
context of the country’s extremely vulnerable situation and its systematic poverty.
Therefore, the suffering of Haiti’s people from the earthquake is situated in the context of
the majority of the population already suffering from the vulnerability and systematic
poverty.
The Earthquake in Japan and Problems Caused
The Great East Japan Earthquake which, struck on March 11, 2011 at the northeastern coast of the main island, resulted in three sequenced events. They are the massive
earthquake, tsunami, and the incident at the nuclear power plant (Arase 2012). The
earthquake’s magnitude was 9.0, and it is recorded as the largest earthquake in Japanese
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history (Kumaresan 2011; Cabinet Office 2015). The 2011 earthquake triggered the
largest recorded tsunami which caused massive problems for not only human life and
health but also transportation and communication in the region (Kumaresan 2011;
Cabinet Office 2015).
The death toll was 15,893 and 6,152 were injured, according to the Cabinet
Office, Government of Japan, and as of September 2015, still 2,573 people were missing.
About 470,000 people evacuated right after the disaster (Cabinet Office 2015).
Comparing with the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995 that caused 6,434 deaths (Cabinet
Office 2015), the Great East Japan Earthquake and the subsequent tsunami caused a
massive effect which Japan had never experienced.
More than 1,146,772 buildings in the area were either fully destroyed or partially
damaged (Cabinet Office 2015). Also, transportation (roads, trains, and airplanes),
lifelines (power, gas, and water), and communication systems were destroyed. The total
estimate of reconstructing the infrastructure was $1.4 trillion (Cabinet Office 2015).
The tsunami hit the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant 40 minutes after the
earthquake which struck the coast of the Pacific side of the Tohoku region, and the plant
was swept and sank by a large tsunami wave (NAIIC 2012). The earthquake damaged
power transmission grids from Shin-Fukushima Electrical substation of Tokyo Electric
Power Company, TEPCO, to Fukushima Daiichi plant, and cut the electricity supply
(NAIIC 2012). The power plant was connected to a backup nuclear line in case of an
emergency from Tohoku Electric Power, but this failed to function due to a cable
connected to a metal-clad type switchgear for Unit 1 (NAIIC 2012). This resulted in
losing all its off-site power for the plants (NAIIC 2012). The tsunami’s massive damage
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attacked not only the power supply systems, but it washed away vehicles, heavy
equipment, heavy oil tanks, dirt, and other debris and broken pieces of the building
(NAIIC 2012). A large amount of seawater flooded all of the key buildings of the power
plants; this resulted in a severe situation where workers were significantly hindered in
responding to the damage and emergency (NAIIC 2012). Among those workers, it was
very difficult to respond to the emergency and make decisions since communications
including the main control room, monitoring, control, and lighting of the plant facilities
were completely lost (NAIIC 2012). They were forced to deal with the accident and make
spontaneous decisions without having much information, such as effective measures and
procedure manuals (NAIIC 2012).
The major obstacle they confronted was the loss of power which made it
extremely difficult to cool the reactors in the allowed down-time since the process of
cooling down the reactors and shutting them down required power to be available
(NAIIC 2012). The plant lost the main control room functions which caused them to lose
access to multiple methods that could have led to a safe shutdown (NAIIC 2012).
Although the reactor cores and fuel storage pools need constant cooling, Unit 1 failed to
remain cooling its reactor (Arase 2012; NAIIC 2012). The reactor of Unit 1 exploded,
blowing off the top of the building, damaging the cables, and injuring five workers
(Arase 2012, NAIIC 2012).
The earthquake and tsunami caused a very serious accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and Dai-ni Power Plant. A large amount of radioactive
materials was released from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant both into the
air and the ocean. The problem of radioactive contamination was very serious, and
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concerns were not only about the health of people who live near the nuclear power plant
including children, but also damage to the agricultural products, livestock, and marine
products, and increased anxiety among the consumers (Investigation Committee 2012). In
addition, it was certain that the accident shocked many countries in the world, and
especially, the discharge of contaminated water to the ocean elevated concern and
criticism from the international community (Investigation Committee 2012).
The problems caused by the earthquake in Japan included the loss of many people
and people’s property, which the tsunami destroyed. Many people lost their family
members and homes, and also many of them were not able to come home due to the
radioactive contamination. The exposure level to radiation and its effect on one’s life had
been a controversial issue which Japan had knowingly faced as an industrial country
holding nuclear power facilities (Onani and Shirabe 2013).
Problems Caused as a Core and Periphery Nation by the Earthquake
Comparing the earthquakes that occurred in Haiti and Japan, one major similarity
is the degree of devastating effect on their infrastructure, people, and the length of time
and endless effort they would need toward recovery of their societies. The aftermath and
issues caused by the earthquake in Haiti were severe. More people lost their lives and
many more people needed to seek safe places to shelter. Haiti, as well, was unable to see
a fully recovered society. A part of the explanation for their vulnerability is being
historically deprived and economically and politically unstable. Their recovery was
focused almost exclusively on their infrastructure, providing places to live for those who
had been living in the camps, and hopefully providing employment to allow them to live
on their feet. On the other hand, Japan, as an industrial nation relying on nuclear power
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development, the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami was a catastrophic disaster.
Japan is forced to struggle with the accident of Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant and its
radioactive contamination.
Dealing with the Problems
Haiti
International aid and humanitarian agencies
There were a number of humanitarian agencies who responded to the earthquake
including neighboring countries, Dominican Republic and other Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Right after the earthquake, International Search and Rescue
Advisory Group (INSARAG) started to arrive in Haiti. Twenty-seven countries offered
teams, including three that were already in the country (Iceland, Dominican Republic,
and the US) within 24 hours, and within 48 hours, six teams were operational (IASC
2010). A total of 26 teams arrived in Haiti by January 15, and they had saved a total of
134 people, which was the highest number of lives rescued by INSARAG recorded, until
the Government called off the search for survivors and INSARAG left Haiti on January
23 (IASC 2010).
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had been working in
Haiti since 2004, and before the earthquake, there were about 7,803 troops, 2,136 UN
police, 464 international civilian staff, 1,239 local civilian staff, and 207 UN Volunteers
(IASC 2010). As the first challenge of those humanitarian communities, it was reported
that there was a limited capacity to respond to the earthquake because those staff were
also affected by the large number of losses in their institutions. Within MINUSTAH,
there were over 100 staff killed including many more staff injured (IASC 2010).
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MINUSTAH’s logistics base was also used for the central hub for other international
humanitarian communities due to its convenient location to the airport, basic
infrastructure, viable telecommunications, and security (IASC 2010).
The first team of United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
(UNDAC) arrived on January 12 within 24 hours after the earthquake (IASC 2010). They
mainly established an Onsite Operations and Coordination Center, worked to assist local
authorities and humanitarian actors working in response, and conducted an assessment of
the initial damage and effect of the earthquake (IASC 2010). Another international
humanitarian community involved in the response was the Organization for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and it estimated that about 400
humanitarian actors were operational by the end of January (IASC 2010). Also, Real
Time Evaluation reported there were about 2,000 humanitarian communities that worked
in various fields in the response (IASC 2010). The estimated number of humanitarian
actors who worked in Haiti varied, but it showed that Haiti was largely dependent on
international support in the response to the earthquake.
Support from international military was another significant response for Haiti.
According to IASC (2010), there were 26 countries, such as Argentina, Canada, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, who provided their military support in various
fields including hospitals, troops, military aircraft, hospital ships, cargo ships, port
handling equipment, and helicopters. Among those, IASC (2010) reported that Canada,
the US, and the Dominican Republic offered the largest contingents. For example, the US
Navy had 17 ships, 48 helicopters, and 12 fixed-wing aircraft right after the earthquake
including 10,000 sailors and Marines, and provided 336 air deliveries delivering 123,000
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liters of water, 532,440 bottles of water 111,082 meals, and 4,100 kg of medical supplies
(IASC 2010).
Donations also were provided from various humanitarian donors. Many donors
formed a Humanitarian Donor Group, including the United States Agency for
International Development, the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European
Commission, the Canadian International Development Agency, the UK Department for
International Development, Spanish Cooperation (IASC 2010). As a role of these groups,
they organized and guided key issues and strategies focusing on developing common
messaging on major areas of concern (IASC 2010).
Because of prompt response of many humanitarian agencies, the emergency
response operation needs were met for a great number of people in the first six months
(Patrick 2011). According to The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2010),













4 million people received food
1.2 million had access to safe water daily
1.5 million people received emergency shelter materials
2.1 million household non-food item kits were distributed
11,000 latrines installed
90% of displaced people in Port-au-Price had access to adjacent health clinics
195,000 children benefited from temporary learning spaces
550,000 children and pregnant or lactating women received supplementary
feeding
1 million people benefited from cash for work
5,900 people relocated from imminently dangerous locations
142,000 people received agricultural inputs for spring planting
2,047 separated children received psychosocial support and 337 were reunited
with their families
(IASC 2010 p.11)

These immediate targets were achieved as the emergency response from many
humanitarian communities right after the earthquake.
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Shelter and displacement
During 2010, humanitarian partners responded to the emergency shelter needs and
provided 117,200 tents, 1,185,052 tarpaulins, and 2.5 million household items including
blankets, mats, and kitchen sets for internally displaced persons (United Nations 2011).
According to United Nations (2011), the camp management group developed a pilot
program and played a role for facilitating the return of 2,714 families. As of June 2011,
73,000 planned transition shelters had been constructed (United Nations 2011).
Severe damage and the situation had not changed for those displaced people after
two years since the earthquake (Oxfam 2012). Over 519,000 Haitians still lived in tents
and under tarpaulins in 758 camps mostly in Port-au-Prince (Oxfam 2012). In addition,
45 percent of the population suffer from food insecurity, and only a few Haitians could
access basic services (Oxfam 2012). One of the issues pointed out about humanitarian
agencies transferring displaced people from shelters to permanent housing was that land
ownership is obscured with no comprehensive cadaster and private notaries. As a result,
humanitarian agencies faced difficulties in building permanent housing since they needed
to start by collecting accurate information of the land to avoid troubles (Oxfam 2012).
The complexities of land tenure in Haiti hindered humanitarian agencies’ efforts to
support recovery and reconstruction for people in Haiti (Oxfam 2012).
The other issue regarding building shelters was the earthquake destroyed about
250,000 housing units and dwellings. As a result, humanitarian agencies constructed
about 96,000 transitional shelters (t-shelters) and 4,600 new homes, and repaired 6,600
by October 2011 (Oxfam 2012). A critical issue of concern was that t-shelters were not
usually stable enough to withstand a severe hurricane in Haiti’s seasons (Oxfam 2012).
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Humanitarian agencies and international aid tended to focus on immediate and short-term
recovery, but some researchers argued for the necessity of long-term recovery when they
supported Haiti (Oxfam 2012; United Nations 2011;)
Most people, who were living in the camps, were not able to leave the camps, and
this was another difficult circumstance which hindered moving to permanent housing
(Oxfam 2011). Unemployment and having insufficient income to meet their basic needs
were the major reasons for people not being able to move back to rented, repaired, or
constructed permanent housings (Oxfam 2011). Also by living in the camps, they were
continuously provided free water, sanitation, health care, and other services. These were
not available for them in the previous places destroyed by the earthquake (Oxfam 2011).
Therefore, returning home and starting to live on their own, for many camp residents,
meant that they would be able to leave the camps only if they were employed with
sufficient jobs to pay basic fees after there was some investment in their local
communities (Oxfam 2011).
Haiti faced a critical issue because it was not considered for long-term investment
to aid displaced people and their futures. Most of humanitarian agencies and international
aid provided were to build temporary shelters and tents with basic needs, therefore, there
was a lack of resources and effort to remove the rubble of destroyed houses (Oxfam
2011). Most donors did not provide enough funding for large scale rubble removal which
was a very important part of recovery process to repair and rebuild housing to allow
people to safely move back to their communities (Oxfam 2011). Because of its economic
situation, Haiti needed to fully rely on international humanitarian communities and
international recovery aid. A large amount of funds had been donated already, but they
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were still not enough to support many Haitians to live outside the camps, and Haiti was
still waiting for the requested funding to arrive (Evans 2011).
Japan
Japanese government and issuing evacuation
Right after the accident, while dealing with the accident at Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plan, there were many questions arose about how the Japanese
government dealt with it. The government did not understand the seriousness of the
accident and the fact that massive quantities of radiation were released into the air and
water. The government’s response was due, partially, to the delay in releasing the
information by the System for Prediction of Environment Emergency Dose Information
(SPEEDI) which constructed the environmental radiation monitoring and the graphic data
(National Diet of Japan 2012). SPEEDI usually monitored radiation exposure in the air
when an accident happened from the nuclear power plant and was supposed to forecast
the presence of radiation based on the data about weather and geography (Shirabe 2013).
By using this information, people were able to prepare for exposure to radiation.
They could evacuate to a safer zone promptly and take iodine tablets to prevent possible
risks of thyroid cancer (Sakiyama 2011). The government and residents should have been
informed about the radiation from SPEEDI and issued evacuation orders, but SPEEDI
information was not disclosed until March 23, 12 days after the accident (Shirabe 2013).
When the information about the exposure to radiation was most needed, the government
failed to use and release the information immediately after the accident (Shirabe 2013).
The government issued an evacuation zone originally in an area within a 3 km
radius from the power plant, but it was changed to 10 km and again to 20 km by the day
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following the accident (National Diet of Japan 2012). On March 15, the evacuation
orders to shelter were issued for residents in the zone between 20 and 30 km from the
power plant (National Diet of Japan 2012). The night of March 11, when the evacuation
order for areas within a 3 km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and
shelter-in-place order for areas within a 10 km was issued, Chief Cabinet Secretary
Edano explained at a press conference about the situation of the power plant and the
reasons for evacuation by stating “This order is a precautionary measure, and is an order
to evacuate. Currently, there are no leakages of radioactivity outside the reactor. At this
time there is no danger to the environment” (National Diet of Japan 2012:15).
On the morning of March 12, when the order was expanded to areas within a 10
km radius from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and a 3km radius of the
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plant, Chief Cabinet Secretary Enado provided
explanations that “… please take note that ordering residents to evacuate to areas outside
the 10km radius zone is only a measure taken to provide utmost assurance” (National
Diet of Japan 2012:15). Moreover, after the hydrogen explosion at Reactor 1 of the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant had happened and workers started to inject
seawater into the reactor (this was when the evacuation order was issued for areas within
a 20 km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant), Chief Cabinet Secretary
Edano explained on the night of March 12 that “Although, as with the response policies
we have taken thus far, there is no actual danger to residents in areas lying between 10km
and 20km from the plant due to the release of radioactivity, we have expanded the
evacuation zone to 20km from the plant, considering the fact that new response measures
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may be taken, for the sake of taking full precautionary measures” (National Diet of Japan
2012:15).
Problems with evacuation orders were caused when the government kept
expanding the evacuation zone and informing residents, not about the actual situation, but
that those zones were precautionary measures for a possible severe situation in the near
future. While the government was expanding the evacuation zones as precautionary
measures, there was increased anxiety and frustration among residents who did not
exactly know what they needed to do to protect themselves.
Residents near Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant and SPEEDI
The members of the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission conducted a survey of approximately 14,000
residents living near the nuclear plant, including workers. As results of the survey, they
found problems with evacuation orders from the residents’ perspective. When the
national government issued evacuation orders after the accident, the local governments
informed the residents about it (National Diet of Japan 2012). Most of residents
evacuated promptly, but because the evacuation order was sudden and they did not know
much information about the accident, many of them went to evacuation shelters with
“little more than the clothes on their backs” (National Diet of Japan 2012:14). From the
survey, it was found out that most of the residents did not know the evacuation was
because of the nuclear accident and thought that they would be able to come home soon
(National Diet of Japan 2012). Many of them mentioned that they would have made the
minimal preparations, such as taking their valuables with them, if they have known that
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the evacuation was due to the nuclear accident and they might not able to return home
again (National Diet of Japan 2012).
It was clear that the government mentioning the evacuation was a precautionary
measure made those evacuees confused about evacuation, and the government failed to
provide useful information based on the residents’ needs (National Diet of Japan 2012).
By constantly expanding the evacuation zones, the government forced evacuees to
relocate. There were many evacuees who had to move to another shelter more than six
times (National Diet of Japan 2012). In the survey, many evacuees mentioned that they
were disappointed and felt helplessness because of the confusion the government created
by expanding the evacuation zones several times. Many residents surveyed said they
were exposed to a high dose of radiation when they followed the initial evacuation order
(National Diet of Japan 2012). Approximately 10 to 15 percent of evacuees left areas
where they later found out there was a high level of radiation (National Diet of Japan
2012: Shirabe 2013). Those, who unknowingly evacuated later, discovered that they had
been to the areas with a high dose of radiation. As a result, they experienced
psychological stress and started to be concerned about the effects on their health
(National Diet of Japan 2012).
Regarding the criticism of how the government caused confusion about the
evacuation and the fact that the data of SPEEDI was not disclosed when most needed, the
National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Commission explained the reason of late disclosure of the data of SPEEDI and the
confusion that the government made.
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When an accident occurs, the SPEEDI system starts to calculate predictive
radioactive diffusion. SPEEDI collects ‘release source information’ which was “the
amount of radioactive material that was being released from the nuclear facility into the
atmosphere by nuclide and time” (National Diet of Japan 2012:55) from Emergency
Response Support System (ERSS). When the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
stopped, ERSS also shut down because the external power supply was lost and other
important devices did not work due to the loss of electric power supply (National Diet of
Japan 2012). Since ERSS did not have the ability to calculate release source information,
SPEEDI also was not able to start calculating the diffusion of radioactive materials
(National Diet of Japan 2012).
When the government released the information from SPEEDI on March 23, the
information about the diffusion of radioactive materials and dose levels were not accurate
(National Diet of Japan 2012). SPEEDI’s calculations were inaccurate because the
information from ERSS was not available, and the Nuclear Safety Commission did the
calculation based on inverse estimations of the past situations of how the diffusion of
radioactive materials occurred (National Diet of Japan 2012). Therefore, although the
data of the diffusion of the radioactive materials right after the accident was finally
available from SPEEDI on March 23, it was not accurate. Since the government was not
able to reach the data from SPEEDI and did not know how and where the radioactive
materials diffused, the evacuation zones were expanded several times without knowing
exactly how far the residents needed to evacuate. This caused a serious burden to the
residents and unnecessary exposure to radiation among evacuees.
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Facing risks and concerns without end
The government’s approach to the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
created confusion among the government itself and the residents living near the power
plant. When the government kept expanding the evacuation zones, the government was
unclear about the situation since the accident was catastrophic, and the risk of a nuclear
power plant explosion is perceived as minimal. Due to the accident, radiation and
contamination were the most difficult problems to deal with. According to the National
Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission,
approximately 900 Peta Bq of radioactive substances were released from the accident
(National Diet of Japan 2012). After the accident, approximately 150,000 people
evacuated (National Diet of Japan 2012). Of those 78,000 evacuees were from the
restricted area (within a 20-km radius from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant)
and about 10,010 evacuees were from the deliberate evacuation area which was outside
the 20-km radius from the nuclear power plant (National Diet of Japan 2012). This was
also an area with concern that the cumulative air dose might reach 20mSv per year after
the accident (National Diet of Japan 2012).
After the accident, the government changed the acceptable radiation exposure rate
to 20mSv from 1mSv per year (Reconstruction Agency 2012: Starr 2013). For this
accident, the government decided to use 20mSv per year as the acceptable radiation
exposure dose based on the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
statement in the ICRP Publication 103 (Reconstruction Agency 2012). The ICRP
recommended its exposure range from 100mSv to 20mSv per year for emergency
exposure situation, such as a nuclear facility accident and had each nation determine the
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acceptable radiation dose based on their circumstances (Reconstruction Agency 2012).
The government decided to use the lowest dose of exposure, 20mSv, for the evacuees and
Fukushima prefecture with the aim to gradually decrease the exposure dose after
decontamination (Reconstruction Agency 2012).
The ICRP also recommended an exposure dose of 1mSv to 20mSv per year for
the accumulated dose of radiation in daily life (Tsuziuchi 2016). Therefore, although
20mSv was still in the range of emergency exposure situation based on the ICRP
Publication 103, the government set 20mSv as the acceptable dose for the evacuees to
return to their home and had the dose of 1mSv as an ideal dose aim after decontaminating
the areas (Tsuziuchi 2016). In order to deal with the problems of exposure to radiation,
the government decided not to evacuate those areas with radiation doses of more than
1mSv, but chose to raise its acceptable radiation dose to 20mSv (Starr 2013: Tsuziuchi
2016).
The government raised the acceptable radiation dose, but it did not mean people
were still safe, and there were no concerns for health effects if people were exposed
under 20mSv per year. Several researchers insisted that there would not be a safe dose to
be exposed to radiation, and low levels of radiation could cause cancer (Caldicott 2014:
Sakiyama 2013: Starr 2013). Each dose could increase the risks of developing a
malignancy or genetic disease when they were accumulated (Caldicott 2014). Also,
Caldicott (2014) argued that high doses of radiation exposure from the nuclear meltdown
accident like the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant and a nuclear weapon explosion, had
the possibility to cause acute radiation sickness, such as hair loss, severe nausea, diarrhea,
and bleeding. Although the government argued that the data from SPEEDI released after
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the accident was not accurate, the SPEEDI did show radiation doses of more than
100mSv in the air near the Fukushima nuclear power plant right after the accident
(Sakiyama 2011). The high radiation levels caused great concern for the health of those
residents living by the power plant.
The exposure was not only caused by the radiation in the air. The released
radioactive cesium from the accident was also deposited in the soil. Approximately, 8
percent of Japan’s land was contaminated by the fallout of radioactive plumes (Fairlie
2013). Starr (2013) discussed that the primary route of internal exposure usually
happened through eating foods contaminated with cesium-137, and this bioaccumulates
in human bodies, plants, and animals. Although the government stated that areas were
safe enough to return and foods were safe enough to eat after decontamination of the
land, the interviews conducted by Tanaka (2016) showed that many people who were
once evacuees and returned to their home expressed their concern and anxiety about
being exposed especially among those who were raising their children.
As an industrial nation with nuclear power plants, Japan faced the risks associated
with nuclear energy. When Japan chose to utilize nuclear energy as energy source, the
nation accepted a terrible burden for those living around the nuclear power plant and the
workers (Koide 2014). The Japanese government had been trying to clean the radioactive
contamination, but in reality “all that can be done is to collect it, place it in containers –
usually plastic bags – and transfer it to another location” (Caldicott 2013:10). The main
question became where to store the nuclear waste safely away from places where it would
not affect human and environment for thousands of years (Caldicott 2013), and the
government had yet to find an answer for it.
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World-System Influence for Different Outcomes Resulting from Haiti and Japan’s
Earthquakes
As a peripheral country dependent on other nations, Haiti has not been able to
develop their own economy and establish stable political structure, therefore Haiti has
remained in poverty and vulnerability since their colonial period. When the earthquake
occurred, Haiti experienced a devastating effect on its infrastructure, and its recovery was
exclusively focused on providing water, food, and safe places to shelter. Since Haiti is
not able to recover its society, it is still a highly dependent country which waits for
humanitarian agencies and international aid provided by other nations. By being
dependent on other nations, Haiti is not able to see a fully recovered society and would
not be able to be an independent nation which could serve their own people and needs
with sustainable economic performance and stable politics.
Japan, as a core nation in the world-system, is characterized by high technology,
which influences the development of nuclear facilities. Japan’s response to the
earthquake necessitated dealing with the accident of Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant and
its endlessly leaking radioactive contamination. In addition, Japan needed to rebuild the
infrastructure of those places where the earthquake and tsunami devastated. Comparing
the response of Haiti and Japan, it is clear that the assumption of Risk Society only
applies to the society of Japan. Being a highly industrialized nation with a strong
economic position implies that it is always associated with risk of its development since
high levels of modern technology and industrialization always contain risks which have
global effects and do not have limitations in time and space. The fact that the Japanese
government has yet to find solutions to deal with the radioactive contamination is an
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example of Risk Society. The radiation threat is associated with the risks forced by core
nations as a result of their core processes. Haiti, a peripheral nation, is not able to afford
these risks since it is unable to develop modern technology.
CONCLUSION
This research investigated the importance of historical factors for different
societies after a disaster. Utilizing comparative-historical methods, this research was able
to approach the subject from the historical background and events connected to today’s
societies. Wallerstein’s world-system perspective helps understand the different historical
processes of Haiti and Japan including how periphery and core nations differ in their
response to the earthquake.
Some advantages of utilizing comparative-historical method for this study are
those large historical documents available to gain information for both countries and its
flexibility to utilize and analyze the information when needed. At the same time, one of
the challenges is the limitation of the knowledge and a lack of skill of the researcher to
effectively analyze the information. The way some information was utilized could be
biased based on how the researcher desired to bring it the discussion, and when this
occurred, some other information would be left out although it was also important to
include in the discussion.
The findings of this study showed the importance of paying attention to a holistic
understanding of a single event happening today. Different degrees of effects of an
earthquake to a society are not just determined by whether a nation is a high-income or
low-income country. Physical conditions and the social structure which have been
developed by a nation through its history are necessary to the analysis, including the
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possible continuous struggles the nation would need to face. This is why Haiti would not
need to worry about radiation contamination and its effects on human bodies caused by a
nuclear power plant, and Japan would not need to wait for international aid to support
their own people, although the earthquake and tsunami was catastrophic. Comparing
Haiti and Japan, Japan has shown much faster recovery after the earthquake in terms of
its social structure, but it will have to continuously seek to deal with the contamination
and its threat to human bodies, and the Japanese government does not know how long it
will take.
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